Introduction
In this paper we attempt to investigate the quantitative relation between crime activities and legal measurable opportunities by means of an analytical tool introduced in literature by D. Carfì: the Pareto Analysis of a Differentiable Decision Problem. Following Ehrlich we develop a quantitative theoretical contribution to the study of crime in economic terms proposing a formal decision model to evaluate quantitatively the reasonability to commit offenses, which emphasizes the relation between crime and punishment. Following Ehrlich, we shall analyze the interaction between offense and defense, moreover we derive some behavioral implications.
The model with two activities
In this section we consider the model presented in Ehrlich [2] . This formal model allows us to present two new generalizations of the economic model itself and a case study.
The context. We assume, in what follows the following points.
for each state of the world s in the unit interval S and any pair of times t in the strategy space T.
First extension of the model
In this section we extend the classic model proposed in [2] assuming that the returns functions and the penalty function are depending upon the entire strategy pair t = (t1, t2).
Assumption 2 bis (monotonicity of the returns).
We assume that the returns of the two activities are two increasing functions W1 and W2, both defined on the time cone T = (R≥) 2 and with value into the real line R, both functions are increasing with respect to the standard orders on the plane with respective signature (+, -) and (-, +). For example, the standard order on the plane with signature (-, +), also called the cost-benefit order is the order defined by t >cb t' if and only if t1 < t'1 and t2 > t'2.
Remark. Denoted by T the strategy cone, we have so, for any index i, an increasing (in the above sense) mapping Wi : T → R.
Assumption 3 bis (uncertainty of illegal returns).
We assume that the final returns of the first activity (the illegal one) depend upon the states of the world belonging to the unit interval of the real line [0, 1]. The return function of the first activity is then a random variable defined on the state space S and with values into the function space T R, namely the return function of the first activity is an application L : S → F ( T, R), mapping each state of the world s ϵ S into a function Ls : T → R.
Interpretation (of the states of the world). Our interpretation of the state space S is the following: the state of the world s represents the degree of punishment, namely 0 represents the state of the world in which the offender is totally safe, on the contrary 1 represents the state of the world in which the offender is fully punished.
Assumption 4 bis (certainty of legal returns).
We assume that the second activity (the legal one) is safe, in the sense that its returns depend only on the time devoted to both activities and not upon the states of the world.
Assumption 5 bis (penalty function).
We assume that the function Ls can be defined by the difference:
that is by
for any pair t in T, where the function F1 : T → R ≥ is an increasing penalty function, with respect to the usual order of signature (+, -).
Definition (payoff random variable).
We can construct a random variable, which we shall call the payoff random variable of the decision-maker, on the set S of states of the world and with values in the function space T R, namely it is the mapping X : S → T R defined by Xs(t) = W1(t) -sF1(t) + W2(t), for each state of the world s in the unit interval S and any pair of times t in the strategy space T.
The payoff function associated with a payoff random variable
Definition (the transformation associated with the random variable). Any random variable of the form X : S → T R can be read, immediately, as a family of functions in the space T R, indexed by the set S, namely the family X = (Xs)s ϵ S so as an element of the hypercube ( T R) S . Moreover, we can associate with the random variable X : S → T R the mapping of T into the Cartesian power (the hypercube) R S defined by fX : T → R S : t → (Xs(t))s ϵ S;
we call this mapping the payoff transformation associated with the random variable X.
The model with two states of the world
We assume now that the state of the world space S contains only two elements, say 0 and 1. Moreover, we assume that the decision maker has total time at his disposal 1 (in conventional unit).
The strategies of the decision maker are triples of non-negative real numbers t = (t1, t2, t3), with unit total duration:
The first component t1, of any possible strategy t, is the time devoted to first activity; the second component t2 is the time devoted to second activity and the third component t3 is the remaining time 1 -(t1 + t2).
So that, the decision constraint of the decision maker is the canonical 2-simplex Δ2(R 3 ) of the 3-space R 3 , that is the convex envelope M3 of the canonical basis e of R 3 .
The construction of the decision problem associated with a random variable. The payoff transformation associated with a random variable
is the function fX : M3 → R S : fX (t) = (Xs (t))s ϵ S .
The power R S can be identified with the Euclidean plane R 2 , since the state space S contains only 2 elements; so that, we can consider the payoff transformation fX as a vector function of the type fX : M3 → R 2 : fX (t) = ( X0 (t), X1 (t)), for each time triple t of the simplex M3. We obtain, in such a way, a multi-criteria decision problem (fX, ≥), associated with the random variable X.
Determination of the topological boundary of the problem (fX, ≥). To solve the above decision problem, we consider the function g : Δ2 → M3 : g (t1, t2) = (t1, t2, 1 -t1 -t2), g is an affine (bijective) parametrization of the canonical 2-simplex M3 (of the 3-space R 3 ) by means of the canonical 2-simplex Δ2 of the plane R 2 (convex envelope of the canonical basis of the plane and its origin). So that, if
is a vector function defined on M3, the composite function
is a parametric section of the function f upon the constraint M3, and moreover, we have
Hence, in order to obtain the payoff space of the decision problem (f, ≥), we can apply the Topological Boundary theorem to the section f ᵒ g.
The applicative example. In our specific problem, we shall consider the function
And, for the extended model, we shall consider the function
defined by
for every pair t in the 2-simplex Δ2.
A case study
We face an Ehrlich generalized decision problem, a case study in which an individual has two activities:
1) a legal one (the first one) 2) and an illegal one (the second one) and in which the conditions are "quite realistic", in the sense that:
• the activities of the individual are in some way connected;
• it is impossible for the decision-maker to avoid the control of the organized crime and consequently he cannot abandon his illegal activity without a "punishment" of this organized crime;
• the Justice takes account of the legal activity when it punishes the decision maker for the illegal one.
Returns and penalty function
We shall consider the (payoff) function f : Δ2 → R 2 , from the canonical 2-simplex of the plane R 2 into R 2 , defined by
for every time bi-strategy t = (x, y) in the triangle Δ2.
Interpretation. If the real pair t = (x, y) is a possible time-strategy of the decision-maker, then:
• the first component x is the time devoted to the legal activity 1;
• the second component y is the time devoted to the illegal activity 2;
• the function W1 is the return function corresponding with the legal activity 1, and defined by
for each pair (x,y) in the triangle Δ2; note that the time y devoted to the illegal activity affects negatively on W1.
• The function W2 is the return function corresponding with the illegal activity 2, defined by W2 (x, y) = xy -¼ x 2 + y + 2, for each pair (x,y) in Δ2; the time x devoted to the legal activity intervenes negatively on W2, but a positive amount xy of returns -due to the positive indirect effect of the legal activity 1.
• the function F2 is the penalty function for the illegal activity 2, defined by F2 (x, y) = 2 + xy -x 2 + ¼ y 2 , for each pair (x,y) in the 2-simplex Δ2; the time x devoted to the legal activity reduces the punishment, but the law consider negative the interaction xy between legal and illegal activity so that the term xy is added to the punishment.
Total Return functions
For what concerns the first component f1 of the payoff function f, representing the payoff of the decisionmaker when he is totally punished, we obtain
for every (x, y) in Δ2.
On the other hand, for what concerns the unpunished case, the component f2 is defined by f2(t) = X0(t) = = W1 (x, y) + W2 (x, y) = (¼ x 2 -y) + (xy -¼ x 2 + y + 2) = = xy + 2, for every (x, y) in Δ2.
Remark. Observe that the functions W2 and F2 are decreasing with respect to the first argument on the portion T0, of the simplex Δ2, formed by the points (x, y) such that y < 2x. For what concerns F2 the interpretation is clear: when the illegal time y is greater than 2 times the legal one, then the punishment is increasing also with respect to the first (legal) argument. On the other hand, on the same subset T0 the return of illegal activity is increasing also with respect to the first argument (for example, the legal activity supports the illegal one, when the latter is sufficiently organized).
Determination of payoff space
This section will be entirely devoted to the determination of the topological boundary of the payoff space f(Δ2).
Payoff function
Thus we have to examine the function f defined by
for each pair (x, y) of the Euclidean plane, upon the strategy constraint Δ2. 
Transformation of the strategy space
First of all we are interested in the determination of the image of the strategic triangle Δ2. Let 0, e1 and e2 be the origin, the first canonical vector and the second canonical vector of the Cartesian strategy plane, respectively. Applying Carfì's methodology, it is sufficient to study the transformation of the boundary of Δ2 and of the critical zone of f on Δ2. In the following figure 2 we show the above transformation. Note that the transformation of the segment [0,e1] is contained in the payoff universe and not in the strategic universe. 
Transformation of the segment [e1, e2]
The segment [e1, e2] is the set of all points (x, y) of the plane R 2 such that x + y = 1 and whose abscissas x lie in unit interval [0, 1] , that is the canonical 1-simplex M2. The image of the generic bi-strategy (x, y) of this simplex is the payoff
From here, we get
The vector (-¼, 2) represents a translation vector, which we can consider after the study of the non-linear part h (x, 1-x) = ( ½ x, x -x 2 ).
Let us put X := ½ x and Y := x -x 2 .
We deduce that the transformation of the 1-simplex M2, by the function h, is the set of all points (X, 
Critical zone
The critical zone of a differentiable game G = (f, >) is the set of all bi-strategies at which the Jacobian determinant of f is 0.
The Jacobian matrix of the function f, at any point (x, y) of the bistrategy space Δ2, is denoted by Jf (x, y) and it is the matrix having as rows the gradients of the gain functions f1 and f2, respectively; the two gradients are defined respectively by grad f1 (x, y) = ( ½ x, -½ y), and grad f2 (x, y) = (y, x), for every bistrategy (x, y) in Δ2.. The Jacobian determinant, at the bistrategy (x, y), is det Jf (x, y) = ½ x 2 + ½ y 2 , for every pair (x, y) in the bistrategy space Δ2.
Critical space
The critical zone is the subset of the bistrategy space Δ2 of those bistrategies (x, y) at which the Jacobian matrix is not invertible, that is verifying the relation det Jf (x, y) = 0,
i.e., in our case, x = y = 0.
In symbols, the critical zone is the singleton Cf = {(0, 0)}.
Determination of payoff space of decision problem
Gathering all the preceding information we obtain our payoff space 
Solution on the equiprobability assumption for the space S
Now, we are interested in the determination of the optimal solution, when it is known that the states of the world 0 and 1 are equiprobable. In the present case, the optimal solution can be obtained by the maximization of the utility average function We analyze two extreme cases:
-the case in which the probability of punishment p is maximum, that is p = 1; -the case where the probability of punishment p equals 0.
We analyze the first case, in which the offender is most likely (certainly) to be punished; then the function defined by g (X, Y)= 0X + 1Y, for every payoff pair (X,Y) in IR 2 .
Interpretation and remark. We note that the level-sets of the function g will be straight lines parallel to the axis of abscissas (horizontal lines). This level-sets will go to intersect the maximal Pareto boundary parabola at the point (0, 2 + 1/4). In this case, it would be appropriate to devote time equally to the legal and illegal activity (indeed the reciprocal image of our (0, 2+1/4) is (1/2,1/2)), so contrary to the common sense, our decision-maker, as he tends to get the maximum profit possible, will not devote his time only to the legal activity (even if he knows will be certainly punished): he will split his time equally between legal and illegal activities, despite maximal probability of punishment.
In the opposite case the probability of punishment is equal to 0, therefore we obtain the objective function g(X, Y) = 1X + 0Y, whose level sets are vertical straight lines that will go to intersect optimally the payoff constraint at the point (1/4, 2) and the reciprocal image of the point (1/4,2) is the bi-strategy (1,0). 
Worst punished gain function with respect to illegal activity
By definition, the worst punished gain function f1 # is defined on the legal strategy space E = U by f1 # (x) = infU f1 (x, .), for every legal strategy x in E. The payoff f1 # (x) is the worst possible payoff of the decision-maker, when it is punished.
Remark. An individual, comparing the gains that he could get by adopting legitimate or illegitimate activities, will notice that a lot of times the profits arising from the illegal ones will be great in comparison to those of legitimate activities. Therefore, he would be brought to infringe. However, he also has to keep in mind of the possible punishments deriving from behaviors against the law. In fact, we can observe three cases:
-the individual devotes his time to illegal activity and he is not punished; -the individual devotes his time to illegal activity and he is punished; -the individual devotes his time to legal activity (and paradoxically) he is punished.
You will get:
when the individual has the tendency to maximize in operation some legal activity and to minimize that illegal, since he is afraid of the consequential punishment from the second or he hears again of a scruple of conscience in to break the law.
Instead, in the opposite case:
The individual will have the tendency to maximize in function of illegal activity and to minimize for that legal; in this case we find us of forehead to an individual that doesn't fear the punishment that could derive from the infringement, rather he could almost say that we find us of forehead to a "inveterate criminal", that has as primary objective that to maximize her profits.
Remark.
Further situation, possible but few probable, would be had in the case in which the individual decided to maximize both in comparison to the illegal and legal activity, in other words he would extend to get the maximum possible from both the activities.
From her max-min precedent we can build the conservative bi-value that furnishes us, in this context, a sort of initial status from which to get further for improving his own profits, in fact he could be taken as value of threat in the problems of selection on the Pareto boundaries v # = (v1 # , v2 # ).
In the case of our study:
So that, the conservative bi-value is the pair (0,2).
Elementary best compromise between punishment-unpunishement
The elementary best compromise bi-gain is the intersection of the segment joining the threat bi-gain v # with the supremum of the game with the Pareto boundary of the payoff space of the game f (Δ2). We calculate this solution on the first parable 
Pseudo-Equilibria

Virtual Nash equilibrium
In our game, the Nash equilibria do not play a major role as we have not precisely a standard game, because of the shape of the strategy space, and moreover, even if we consider the smallest possible game containing our payoff function, it does not fall within our space of strategies; as we shall show below. Let us run out the calculations: we have f (x, y) = ((1/4) (x 2 -y 2 ), xy + 2).
We get:
∂1f1(x, y) = ( 
2 Generalized Nash solution
However, refining the analysis, i.e. taking into account not the entire strategic area, but the square subspaces with the infimum-vertex at the origin, upon each of them we have a Nash equilibrium. The continuous sequence of Nash equilibria forms a so called Nash path. The Nash equilibrium corresponding to the maximum square contained into our strategic triangle falls within our strategy space itself, going to be the best compromise between legal and illegal activity. This extreme equilibrium is what we call the generalized Nash solution of our problem.
The below figure shows the Nash path (in yellow) and the generalized Nash solution (½, ½).
